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IN T°HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
CLYDE HUTCHESON, ) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Appellant, 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
-vs- : 
) 
LARRY GLEAVE, PATRICIA GLEAVE NO. 16944 
DELOY SHAW and HELEN SHAW, ) 
Defendants and ) 
Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The Plaintiff entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase Agreement with the Defendants for the purchase of 
property known as the "Elbow Ranch" in Piute County, Utah. The 
Plaintiff made payment to the Defendants of $40,000.00. The 
Defendants continued in possession of the prope~ty and the parties 
continued to negotiate the details of the sale. 
The Defendants sold a major portion of the property to a 
third party. Without knowledge of this fact, the Plaintiff com-
menced an action for specific performance. Later, upon learning of 
the binding sale of a highly material portion of the property to a 
third party, the Plaintiff's Complaint was amended to seek return of 
the $40,000.00 deposit made by him. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court entered a judgment in favor of Defendants 
and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint thereby permitting the 
Defendants to retain the Plaintiff's $40, 000. 00 deposit as damages, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the Lower 
Court reversed and a judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff fo1 
the sum of the $40, 000. 00 .. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 30, 1977, the Defendants listed their ranch 
property known as the "Elbow Ranch" for sale with Bushnell Real 
Estate Company, which listing was taken by one of its agents, 
Cathy Bagley (Exhibit #7). 
A legal description of the property sold and a specific 
description of the water rights and equipment was not given to 
the realtor nor to Plaintiff. However, a statement of offering 
information was prepared by the real estate agent (Exhibit 4f.9) and 
made available to the Plaintiff. 
The Exhibit provided the ·Elbow Ranch consisted of 3800 
deeded acres and approximately 4000 acres of leased school 
sections. 
The water right with the ranch consisted of a storage 
right in Manning Reservoir as well as all rights of Don Springs, 
Tibideau Canyon, Swift Springs, and 10/17ths of the first three 
and one-half feet of Dry Creek Canyon. 
- 2 -
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It was further represented that there was operated on the 
property three central irrigating pivots in irrigating approx-
imately 580 acres and mineral rights were available on 3200 acres. 
The property was offered for sale to the Plaintiff. 
Negotiations were commenced in 1977 which resulted in a series of 
signed Earnest Money Agreements, the last of which was executed on 
the 28th day of February, 1978, (Exhibit #12) a copy of which is 
annexed to this Brief as Appendix i. 
The agreement also refers to and incorporates an earlier 
agreement~ which agreement is Exhibit #11, and attached as a part 
of this Brief, as Appendix ii. 
The Plaintiff was relying upon the sale of Arizona 
property as a ·source for payments required during the year of 1978 
(Tr.130, 131 & 132). The parties knew the full payment was 
conditioned upon the Arizona sale and included a handwritten 
provision to take care of the problem in Exhibit 4f.12 and which 
read: 
The balance of 1978 payments is to be 
secured by a mortgage on a 42-unit 
motel known as the "Time Motel" of 
Flagstaff, Arizona, or property of 
similar value. Interest at the rate 
of 8-1/2% per annum on the unpaid 
portion of the down payment will be 
due and payable when the balance of 
the 1978 payment is made (No later 
than October 15, 1978). 
- 3 -
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Payments totaling $40,000.00 were made to Sellers prior 
to April 10, 1978 (Tr. 131, L 14 & 15; Tr. 238, L 9-12). 
The Sellers were required, as conditions precedent to the 
contract, to have the irrigating system in good working order, 
furnish an abstract or title insurance showing the Sellers had 
good and marketable title to the property being sold. (See 
Exhibit 10) 
The pivots were not in reasonable operation on April 10, 
1978 (Tr. 27, 32, 37, 49) and, as a matter of fact, the Defendants 
have filed a_ lawsuit against the manufacturer and installers of 
the irrigation equipment for defective erection (Tr. 121, 245 & 
·246). 
Defendant Deloy Shaw testified, commencing Tr. 245, Line 
30 and continuing Tr. 246: 
Q (Mr. Olsen) Now, we've talked quite a bit about 
the circular sprinkler system and the other day you told us you 
were in the Federal District Court in a lawsuit with the manu-
facturer of this sprinkler equipment. 
A (Mr. Shaw) Yes. 
Q Who is representing you in that lawsuit? 
A Mr. Mciff. 
Q Now, did the manufacturer sue you or did you sue 
them? 
A We sued them. 
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Q In your pleadings or in any statement you have 
made, have you claimed that the equipment wasn't put together 
properly at the time of the initial installation on the land? 
A Yes. 
Q You're making that claim? 
A Yes. 
Q Are you making a claim that because of the faulty 
installation, it just didn't work properly? 
A Yes. 
Material portions of the land had been conveyed to Keith 
/Barben and separately to Verl Henrie, which were part of the 
original Elbow Ranch (Tr. 23 & 24; Tr. 182, 183). The conveyances 
included a conveyance of a part of the water right known as "Don 
Spring". (Exhibits #5 & #6) 
The property was to have mineral rights in 3200 acres 
which were a major consideration to the Plaintiff (Tr. 124, 125, 
126). 
At the time the parties met to review the transaction on 
April 10, 1978, a title report was presented to the Plaintiff and 
his attorney (Exhibit #14). The title report showed some 18 title 
objections, including a reservation by Western Gateway and Storage 
Company, formerly, American Packing and Provision Company, a Utah 
corporation, in 2165.75 acres and an outstanding mineral lease to 
Phillips Petroleµm Company. 
- 5 -
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Various matters were discussed on April 10th, including 
the Plaintiff's ability to pay as well as the problem with the 
mineral rights and for the first time the Plaintiff was pre-
sented with a Uniform Real Estate Contract for his review (Exhibit: 
:ff 16). 
There was objection to the form of the Agreement and the · 
Defendants' attorney was to re-draft the agreement and send a 
copy to Plaintiff and his attorney (Tr. 100 & Tr. 142, Line 29). 
No agreement was ever drafted or presented to the Plaintiff for 
his review. 
The Defendants continued in possession of the property 
and operated it "as usual" during the entire year of 1978 (Tr. 
238 & 239). The parties had a series of contaets with the 
Plaintiff personally but at no time did anyone mention an in-
tention to forfeit out the $40,000.00 deposit of the Plaintiff. 
On August 17, 1978, the Defendants sold a major part of 
the property to a buyer for $700,000.00 (Exhibit #20). No notice 
of this contract was given to the Plaintiff. On June 6, 1978, 
a telephone call had been initiated by the Defendants' attorney 
to Plaintiff's attorney, John Robinson, during the negotiations 
on ranch property. Without the knowledge of Mr. Robinson, the 
conversation was taped by Mr. Mciff. The conversation concerned 
when additional cash could be put into the Utah venture. The 
discussion was amicable and Defendants reaffirmed that they were 
willing to cooperate and finalize the transaction (Tr. 287 
through 293). 
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A date of June 12th was arrived at as a "cut-off" date 
so the Defendants could advise Zions First National Bank of a 
date they anticipated payment would be made. However, the parties 
agreed the "cut-off" date was not critical since the Defendant 
Sellers had a substantial redemption period. Mr. Gleave spec-
ulated about the reaction of Zions First National if the payment 
was not made by June 12, 1978 as follows: 
"I am sure they will, you know, i.f they do file a 
notice, why we have still got the 90 days anyway" (Tr. 292, Line 
2). 
A more detailed analysis of the telephone conversation 
is included under Plaintiff's Argument in this Brief. 
The Plaintiff received no notice from any party that the 
Defendants intended to terminate the contract and forfeit the 
$40,000.00 deposit he had made. 
The Plaintiff brought an action for specific performance 
of the contract. (R. 1-8) Upon learning that a major part of 
the property had been sold, the Complaint was amended to recover 
the $40,000.00 deposited with the Defendants sirice the Defendants 
could no longer perform their proposed contract. 
At the trial the Defendants did not show any damage 
resulted to them. They did show they made an advantageous 
re-sale since they sold ~ part of the prope~ty to Virginia Jenkins 
for $700,000.00 (Exhibit #7) and the balance of the property 
had a value of $433,800. The Defendants were benefited by the 
- 7 -
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sum of $171,300.00 over the Plaintiff's contract (Exhibit #12). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A FORFEITURE 
OF $40,000.00 
A. THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES WAS NOT CLEAR 
AND HAD NO SELF-EXECUTING FORFEITURE PROVISION 
B. NO NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TERMINATE CONTRACT 
AND FORFEIT THE PLAINTIFF'S PAYMENT WAS EVER 
GIVEN 
C. THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT DISGUISE THE FORFEITURE 
BY THEIR WEAK ATTEMPT TO SHOW DAMAGES 
This Court has had many occasions to consider unearned 
(Utah 1935) 40 P2d 175, this Court stated: ''[f]orfeitures have 
not been and are not now favored by the law. * * *Any acts or 
statements suggesting an intention to keep a contract alive are 
liberally construed as a waiver of the right of forfeiture." 
Likewise, in the case of Green vs·.- Palfreyman, (Utah 
1946) 166 P2d 215, the Court stated: n[f]orfeitures are not 
favored, and in interpreting an agreement, every reasonable 
presumption should be indulged against an intention to allow a 
forfeiture." 
- A -
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In Peterson vs. Hodges, (Utah 1951) 239 P2d 180, this 
Court again stated: "[F]orfeitures are not favored. Even con-
tracts which expressly provide for a forfeiture will not be 
extended beyond the strict and literal meaning of the language 
used." 
* * *The parties insisting on the forfeiture must comply 
strictly with all contract requirements and with conditions 
authorizing the forfeiture. So, when the forfeiture is dependent 
on the making of a demand and failure to comply with the demand, 
the failure to make a proper, specific and reasonable demand is a 
failure to the enforcement of the forfeiture by a Court of law or 
equity." S. T. McKnight Co. vs. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
120 F2d 310 (C.A.A. Minn.) as cited in 17A CJS, Contracts, §407, 
p. 497. 
In the light of the clear rule of this Court, the specific 
contract and conduct of the parties should be reviewed. 
A. THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES WAS NOT CLEAR AND 
HAD NO SELF-EXECUTING FORFEITURE PROVISION 
The parties had a series of negotiations and signed a 
series of Earnest Money Agreements, the last of which was executed 
February 28, 1978 and incorporated aspart of the previous agree-
ment of December 12, 1977 (See Appendix i and Appendix ii attached 
to this Brief). 
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In the period of negotiations, several things were dis-
cussed. The discussions included the property, water rights, pivot 
sprinklers, permit rights which were to be sold. The agreement 
attaches no real property description or itemization of what was to 
be sold. The Defendants did not own all of the property originally 
used as the "Elbow Ranch". Also, portions of the ranch property 
were conveyed by Defendants to others (Tr. 18, L 17; Tr. 22, 23, 
24, 36 & 37). Therefore, the Earnest Money· Agreement itself 
contemplated a final contract would be prepared to meet these 
specifics. No acceptable final agreement was completed although 
Defendants' attorney was to prepare and furnish the Agreement to 
Plaintiff (Tr. 100 & Tr. 142, L 29). 
The Plaintiff paid to the Defendants $40,000.00 prior to 
April 10, 1978. The balance of the payments to be made in 1978 
was to be made· from the sale of 150 acres of farm land to be sold 
by the Plaintiff in the State of Arizona (Tr. 132, L 25-28). 
Therefore, the parties inserted into their contract the following: 
"Balance of 1978 payments is to be secured by a mortgage on a 42-
unit motel known as the "Time Motel" in Flagstaff, Arizona, or 
property of similar value. Interest at the rate of 8-1/2% per 
cent per annum on the unpaid portion of the down payment will be 
due and payable when the balance of the 1978 payment is made (no 
later than October l5, l978)." [emphasis ours] 
On August 17, 1978, the Defendants sold a major portion 
of the ranch property being purchased ,.by Plaintiff to a Virginia 
Jenkins for $700,000.00. (See Exhibit #20) 
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Nevertheless showing his good faith, Plaintiff, 
after securing the extension of time for further payments in 
1978, authorized the release of his $40,000.00 deposit to the 
Defendants for their use (Tr. 194 L 26-30; Tr. 195; Tr. 199). 
The Plaintiff did not take possession of the property 
in the year of 1978. The property was operated "as usual" by 
the Defendants. The Defendants grazed their cattle upon the 
property and made use of the permit; harvested the alfalfa 
which was raised and fed it to their cattle and grazed the 
alfalfa fields as they had the previous year (Tr. 159, I~ 26-30; 
Tr. 160, L 1-4). 
In the continuing contact between Plaintiff and the 
Defendants, there was never any noti~e or statement made to the 
Plaintiff that his interests in the property would be forfeited 
unless he paid an additional $160,000.00 by a certain or specific 
date. 
No notice of the contract negotiations with Virginia 
Jenkins was ever given to the Plaintiff and he had no knowle<J.ge of 
the transaction until he called one of the Defendants and advised 
him that he had an additional $160,000.00 {n the month of August, 
1978. Plaintiff was advised to call the ~eal eitate agent. The 
real estate agent then told the Plaintiff of the property sale to 
Virginia Jenkins (Tr. 113, L 4-27). 
1 1 
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The Earnest Money Receipt (Exhibit #12) makes no provisi~ 
for a method of forfeiting any amount of funds and the conduct of 
the parties would give no indication of any such intention. 
In the case of Leone vs. Zuniga, 34 P2d 699 (Utah 1934) 
this Court has discussed the difference between contracts con-
taining self-executing forfeiture provisions and those containing 
provisions requiring notice of forfeiture. The decision approved a 
statement from Pomeroy, Specific Pe·rfortnanc·e· 'o'f Contracts (3rd Ed.) 
§393, p. 836, and held that where the clause was not absolute, 
causing the contract to be automatically void upon default in 
payment at the time specified, but rather containing language which 
gave the vendor an election to treat the contract as avoided, 
required that the vendor, if he intends to avail himself of the 
provision, must give the purchaser timely and reasonable notice of 
his intention to avoid the contract, or must do some unequivocal 
act which unmistakably shows that intention, for the vendor cannot 
treat the default alone as terminating the agreement. 
The Utah Supreme Court further concurred with the well-
reasoned Michigan case of Miner vs. Dick~y, 140 Mich. 518, 103 
NW 855, and approved the following language: 
* * *The relations between the parties 
were contract relations. It is apparent 
that these relations might continue to 
exist after the breach of contract by 
the vendee; the vendor having the right 
to waive the breach, or to forgo her 
remedy therefor* * *We do not mean to 
hold that parties to such a contract may 
not stipulate that. a specified breach or 
breaches of the contract shall at once 
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determine the contract relations and work 
a forfeiture of the vendee's rights 
thereunder. The contract in this case 
does not so stipulate. The provision is 
that after breach the vendor shall have 
a right to declare the contract void. 
The rule that the vendor must terminate 
the contract relations by a notice of 
forfeiture or otherwise, or that the 
defendant must do some act or thing 
which of itself determines the contract 
relationship, before proceedings to 
recover possession of premises can be 
begun, is well settled. 
In the case of Crestview~Holiday Home Owners Associ-
ation, Inc., vs. Engh Floral Company, (Utah 1976) 545 P2d 1150, 
this Court, after holding that the provisions in the contract were 
not self-executing and thus requiring some affirmative act on the 
part of the seller, stated: 
Therefore, the contractual relations between 
the seller and the buyer are in existence until 
such time as the seller chooses to notify the 
defaulting buyer of its election to proceed under 
one, or all, of its options. In so doing, seller 
must give the defaulting buyer a reasonable time 
within which to cure the default. Without this 
notice, the defaulting buyer would not know what 
to do. He would not have certain knowledge his 
tenancy was at an end. He could assume that the 
seller may have waived default, or would elect to 
enforce the contract rather than forfeit it; or 
he could assume he would be permitted to perform. 
The Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit #12) does not have 
any self-executing forfeiture clause. Therefore, the sellers were 
required to give reasonable notice of their intention to declare a 
forfeiture of the deposit and to terminate the contract. 
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In the case of Lamont vs. F.vken, (Utah 1973) 
508 P2d 532, this Court analyzed a similar situation under a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract: 
Before a seller of land under a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract can exercise any of the options 
given him because of a failure on the part 
of the purchaser to pay an installment as 
promised, he must give the purchaser notice 
of the default and a reasonable time in 
which to bring the contract current. 
The Court then went on to state: 
The rule is especially applicable in cases 
like the instant one where th~ default was 
overlooked by the partiei for some 15 
months. 
B. NO NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TERMINATE CONTRACT 
AND FORFEIT THE PLAINTIFF'S PAYMENT WAS 
EVER GIVEN 
The discussion under Sub-section A of this Brief 
was of the contract of the parites as· well as the requirement to 
give some reasonable notice of an election to forfeit a contract 
right. There must be a notice which would advise of the inter-
pretation placed on the contract and permit some opportunity to 
rehabilitate the contract. The notice requirement was partic-
uarly important in this case since the terms of the contract 
needed to be finalized. 
In this case, no notice was given to Plaintiff of 
any intention to terminate the contract and sell the property 
to a third party. 
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The Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of Kammert 
Brothers Enterprises vs. Tanque Verde Plaza· Compahy, (Ariz. 1966) 
428 P2d 678, stated that a forfeiture notice must be "clear and 
unequivocal to be effective." Stating further that a notice which 
"merely declared the contract to be in default fails as a matter 
of law to constitute a notice of forfeiture." 
The Defendants make no claim that they have given the 
Plaintiff notice of any type concerning an. intention to terminate 
the contract and forfeit out the $40,000-.00 deposite~ by Plaintiff. 
Defendants rely upon a telephone conversation between one of the 
Defendants, Mr. Gleave, and the Defendants' attorney, Mr. Mclff, 
and Attorney John Robinson in Arizona who was representing the 
Plaintiff. An examination of the conversation, recorded without 
the knowledge of Plaintiff's attorney, shows an amicable situation 
existed between the parties. The conversation affirmed the 
parties' intention to continue their existing relationship and not 
to terminate it. 
We set out the telephone conversation commencing Tr. 289 
so that it can be reviewed in detail: 
MR. McIFF: What we think we would like to do, John, 
not that we want to be difficult at all, but we would 
just like to set a cutoff date so that you could tell 
that to the people you're dealing with and we can tell 
it to the Bank and we can say to the Bank, "Okeh, this 
is the day. If we don't resolve it by then, ~hen we 
- 15 -
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will do something else." What--can you give us a date 
that we can rely on and then we will all go with that? 
Could we rely on the 12th? 
MR. ROBINSON: If you would, let me say the 15th and 
then that would give us a couple extra days dmm here. 
Just in case something screws up again. 
MR. McIFF: What about the 15th., Larry? Can you 
live with that? 
MR. GLEAVE: I think we can live with the 15th, but 
it couldn't be any later than that. 
MR. McIFF: Tell your people that Clyde's put some 
money in it that he runs the risk of losing and that they 
had better be aware of that. 
MR. ROBINSON: I have made them all totally aware of 
that. 
MR. McIFF: V\lbat we propose to do then is call Zions 
Bank and tell them that's our cutoff date. 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 
MR. McIFF: And that we--if we cannot close the deal 
on or before that date then we will go--
MR. ROBINSON: Go another route--
MR. McIFF: Yes, we will go another route and try to 
solve our problem. 
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MR. ROBINSON: If it would do any good, I will still 
be glad to talk with the people at Zions and let them 
know what's happening and why. 
MR. McIFF: Well, of course, Larry has had most of 
the contact with them and I know he's talked to them, 
what, Larry, fifteen times? 
MR. GLEAVE: Yes. 
MR. McIFF: And Mr. Bushnell from Bushnell Realty 
has talked with them. 
MR. GLEAVE: I'll tell them of this development. 
MR. ROBINSON: Okeh. 
MR. McIFF: Okeh. 
MR. GLEAVE: I am sure they will, you know, if they 
do file a notice, why we've still got the ninety days 
anyway. 
MR. ROBINSON: You still have the redemption period. 
MR. GLEAVE: But we 1 ll try to keep them from filing 
notice. 
MR. ROBINSON: Okeh. 
MR. McIFF: John, will you please keep me posted? 
MR. ROBINSON: As soon as I receive any different 
information, I'll give you a call. 
MR. McIFF: Okeh, alright. We'll--
MR. ROBINSON: Right now, I'm waiting for other 
people to give me information and when they do, I'll let 
you know. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. McIFF: Yes, call me as soon as you know anything 
so that I can get everything ready from our end, you 
know, the paper work and that, I'll get that--
It is apparent from the conversation the parties were 
cooperating with one another that there was no extreme urgency. Mr, 
Gleave clearly indicated time was not of the essence and even if 
they had a problem with their financing institution, "Why we've 
still got the ninety days anyway." 
The Plaintiff was never advised by his attorney or by any 
of the Defendants there was a cut-off date which would affect his 
contract rights (Tr. 301, L 18-28). 
The conversation could not be construed to be a "Notice of 
Forfeiture" which was clear and unequivocal. On the contrary, it 
can only be interpreted that the parties would work out some other 
accommodation. 
C. THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT DISGUISE THE FORFEITURE 
BY THEIR WEAK ATTEMPT TO SHOW DAMAGES 
In the case of Johnson· vs. Carman, (Utah 1977) 572 P2d 371, 
this Court has summarized the law on the damages required to be 
shown to support a forfeiture provision. This Court restated its 
holding in Kay vs. Wood, (Utah 1976) 549 P2d 709 as follows: 
This Court has long been committed to the 
rule that parties to a contract may agree as 
to amount of liquidating damages that shall 
be paid in the case of a bre~ch, that th~ 
agreement is enforceable if the ·amount 
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stiuplated to is not disproportionate 
to t~e.dam~ges actually sustained. The 
provision in a contract for the sale of 
real property that all payments which 
have been made will be forfeited as 
liquidated damages will not be enforced 
if the_forfeitu:e would be grossly 
exce~sive and disproportionate to any 
possible loss so as to shock the conscience. 
See also Perkins vs. Spen~er, 121 Utah 468, 
243 P2d 446 (1952); Jacbb~~h vs. Swan, 
3 U2d 59, 278 P2d 294 (1954); .Peck vs. Judd, 
7 U2d 420, 326 P2d 712 (1958). 
This Court in Perkins vs. Spencer,· sti'pra. specified 
evidence to be used to calculate damages at the time of a breach. 
These factors are: 
~ 
(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the 
property; 
(3) Any decline in value due to change in 
market value of the property not allowed 
in items 1 and 2; 
(4) For the fair rental value during the 
period of occupancy. 
The evidence before the Lower Court must be reviewed con-
cerning the question of damages. No evidence was offered by the 
Defendants concerning the loss of an advantageous bargain. As a 
matter of fact, the evidence before the Court was that the Defen-
dants had entered into a contract to sell the property to the 
Plaintiff for $962,500.00 (Exhibit #12); that a major part of the 
property (a water right) was sold to Virginia Jenkins for $700,000.00 
(Exhibit #20) and that there remained all of the property except 
water from Manning Creek. The remaining property had .a value of ... ·" 
$433,800~00, (See Exhibit #7) making a total of $1~133,800.00 or 
a profit of $171,300.00 over the Earnest .Money offer of Plaintiff .. 
- 19 -
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The only attempt made by the Defendants to show damage 
was that they had anticipated or expected the Plaintiff would seed 
part of the crops on the ranch property. Possession of the ranch 
property was never delivered to the Plaintiff and the Defendants 
operated the property as usual. However, for some reason they 
claimed the Plaintiff should have planted additional crops and 
given Defendants the benefit of those crops. This view overlooks 
the fact that Defendants had possession, use.and occupancy during 
the full year 1978 as well as the use of Plaintiff's $40,000.00. 
It also overlooks the vital fact that if the Plaintiff 
were entitled to possession he was also entitled to all of the 
crops produced upon the land. If Defendants' theory is adopted, 
the Defendants should have been accounting to Plaintiff for their 
use of the property during the year of 1978. 
CONCLUSION 
The Earnest Money Offer Contract existing between the 
parties contemplated the execution, by the parties, of a final 
contract which would describe specifically the property sold by 
legal description. This was required since the property known as 
the "Elbow Ranch" was parceled out to several parties before the 
contract was entered into by the Plaintiff. The general description 
"Elbow Ranch" was not certain enough to be a completed contract 
between the parties. 
- ')() -
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The Defendants continued to deal with and encourage the 
Plaintiff in entering into a final sales contract during the 
full year of 1978; during that ye~r Defendants, with~ut notifying 
Plaintiff who had a written contract allowing him until October 
15, 1978 to pay the pending installments, sold a major portion 
of the property to a third party on August 15, 1978. 
The Defendants also failed to give any notice that they 
intended to terminate the negotiations and to declare forfeit 
the deposit paid by the Plaintiff and failed to give Plaintiff 
any notice that would afford him an opportunity to repair any 
claimed default or review a proposed final contract. 
Further, no damages were proved by Defendants to support 
a forfeiture of $40,000.00. 
The Appellant respectfully submits to this Court that· 
the Judgment of the District Court should be reversed and a 
judgment entered in his favor for the $40,000.00 deposit for-
feited by order of the Lower Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
_,,;;-:~1 ;:-~---hr-) -~~L;;,::~~1--ir>~'!:.4_.,.=..f_...t-,.......,.:~"'-........ "'--_,, ____________ _ 
Tex R. Olsen -
Olsen and Chamberlain 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
?1 -
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the -7t/i_ day of July, 
1980, I personally delivered two (2) copies of the within and 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, to Mr. K. L. Mciff, Attorney 
at Law, at his office at 151 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah. 
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---~--- ~=-~El Pr AND OFFER TO PURCHA::>t 
/\CHEEM:EN'l' DAT:.::D DEC 6 I 1977 
Richf~_cld Feb ?3 19 78 --------------~Utah.-----------~ 
NSIDcP.Al!ON OF your agreement to uu• your ellor"h lo p11Hen1 this offt>r 10 lh1i Seller 11,.. 0 -::-__ C_l....:.;y'-'-G_e_._· _J_I_u_.t_c_}_~_e_r-_,_o_n_. _______________ _ 
: .,,jrh you OS c:ornesl money the sum of IS 10, 000 , Ten thouGar:a 0:.11 '\.T ---.-------- - DOLLARS. 
op ply on the pure ho •• of I he prop ~r ly SillJ 0 Ted 0 I: __ f:_, P_:._0_~ _o~~r:--'_1-=-·:~:r-~.-=-:._:~n~,--_~-~1~~~~~~~~~~--:_-....i-'Pr:..--=r~Y.o;J;p~-8=---=r~-:-t:..-~Y~~~l-(::: ... -Y:.:.!.~O~-,::'-!:...!-l;_-_::~-:l.~-G'::::.-.~..:..-::-'::'!.o~l~-,.::::);O~-.:.:. .. -;:~::-':·~-\.;:.;:::::-;.-r~-l:..:C~-1:.:·-1._-_-_-_-:_-:_-_-_- __ _ 
--------.:-::f------~-----·Cily County, Stole of ___________ _ 
ol tht followinQ items 1 0 1 pres&nl oltothed lo lhe pr&mises: Pl1Jmbing ond h&ating fixlvros ond equipment including slo~er and oil tonh. waler healers ond burners, 
1lun1 ••eluding bulbs, bathroom fixtures. roller shode1, curtain rods and fi,.lvres, v&nitlion blinds, window ond· door screens, linoleum, all shrubs and trees, ond ony other 
-0-
pa 11onol property shall oho bo Included tu port of the properly pur~houd 1 ____ -_0_,_-_______________________________ _ 
,01 pvrcho•e p;icu of 1s_,9:_6_J_?_-_..,.c5:_0_. _0_,_._0_0 ____ !_.J_i_r_._e __ 1_1'_"1_n_~_<l_r_. _e_d--1.,_..:.8:..:l:..: • ..:.X..:..1...:...1..~Y_...:t:....':.:..-!...:O:__...:t:..:h:.:..:0_:1:::.l.=S:.:['::..n:..:..a=1..2,'.__.:.:.:f:..:l=· ..:..V:...e=-_:h:_:_:U::_:D:..:_~:_:·-~:· _:C:._(::l_::...:..::.....:....:...::...:..::_ __ DOllARS ( . 10 ono 00 
''" as follows: $ 1 ,.) - • which repr1.,-.nh lh1t ofor•d~.cribe-d d.,.posir. r1tc.,ipt _of which is hereby ocknowledged by you: 
·----------~~~~~~~~~~--------------~----------------~---------on del~ory of deed or finol conlrod of 
ti b~ on or before .l~Dril 10 . 19_7 ___ , ond $' eoch monlh comm-encing ___ ----------....... ----
r::'!ent schedule prior to closinc;: $20iCOO - March 6, 1978; $10,000 - i·iarch 20," 1978; :-
... : 080 ~ Aoril 10 1 8· Pavment schedule afte:r closing; Mn:J' 1, 1973 - ~25,000; 
1 ~ 1,·1973 - i?5,000; Oct0ber 15, 1978 - $50 1000; Balance of S7o2,500 shall be uaid 
follr:n·:s: On E0.r 15, ·.1979 and Har 15, 1980, naymt:mts shall be 352,00·J arld sh.,11 be paid 
escrow holder directly to Z±pns First National Bank; Commencing Mar 15, 1981, annual 
;tallmenb:~ of $70, 9.)1.06 (includes interest at the rate of 8;'?;·; per annui71) Gh8.ll be due .. i 
- ·1 
:...l _.;)..;_.·;:_:;.,__y_'1_b_l_e:--u_n_t_·_i_l _ b_a_l_ci_.n_c_c __ i_s _ _,...p_o_~·-_i_d _ i_n __ f_u_l_l_. ___________________________________ /I 
ice of S ?G'? 1 500. OQ together with inl1>rest is paid; provided. however, tho! buyer ot hi_s option, of CfS{; time-, moy pay omounfJ in excess of the monthly 
' the unpaid bolonce, 1ubjecl lo the limilalions of ony mortgage- or conlrocl by the b:.iyer here-in cusum&d. ln!orMt 01~_0/0 p11r annum on lhe unpaid portions of the 
lo be included in the prescribed poymenh and Jholl begin os of dote of poHeaion which shall b& on or ~foro /i ;yr~ J 1 Q._19---23 All risk of loss ond deslrvclion 
'd e•penses al insurance sholl bo born!!> by the seller until dole of pouenion al whidi time properly loxes, renh, insurance, inl.,re>I and olh"r .,,pensos of the properly sholl 
ol dole of possession. All other loxes ond oll ouaumenh, morlgogos, chattel liens end other li•ns, encumbrencus er charges ogoinsl the prop,.rt1 of ony nature shall be paid 
xcept·'--~--~=-----~------------------------------------~--------------------
owing special improvements or<• included in !his sole; Sewor 0--Connecl&d Q. S-eptic lonlr. ond/or Cesspool QJ, Sidewalk O. Curb oncl Guller {]. Sp1>ciol Street 
•eciol Street. lighting O. Culinary Water (City ['.}-Connectod O. Other Community Sys~m ill-connected Q, f'rivott{.[}-Connected [] .) Legend: Yes (xf No (?( except 
- I.-· 
S:i le or Instrument of convey.an ce to be rn ad e in the name of _....:C::::.:..L="':..YJ._:;:d:..:c==-~lc::.iu-=-t=-=c~h"°-=c-=s=--.:::o-=n:;;;_ ____________________ _ 
rmenl i• received ond offer is mode subject to the wri!lon occeplance of the st•ller endooed hereon within___ll ..;./-.1::>_._ ____ doys from doto hereof. end unlen 
oturn of lhe money herein receipted shall cancel this offer withoul domoge lo the vnd&rsign&d o:;ient. 
•vent the purchaser foils ro pay the bolonc" of said purchou1 pric" or complttlo said pur-chos!I as hitreln provided. the omovnts poid hon•on sholl, ot the option of the s"llor, 
liqvidoted ond ooreed domoQes. 
,derstood ond 09reed tho! the terms wrirten in this r"ceipt conslitule the entire Preliminory Conlrocl bolwoon the purcho<er and the seller, ond !hot no v~rbol •lotemenl mode 
tive lo this lroraoclion shall be construed to be o port of this tran>oclion· unless incorporoled in writing herein. It is fvrlher o!}reed !hot execulion of the final conlrocl shall 
ornesl Money Receipl and Offer to Purchase. r ·: 
.. ~~..., I 
::mcll Real ~~::;hd:c Inc Ag""' sy ___ _,,__i· .... (u..~--.... l~·1=~ .... \_i'-+l--t~-;-___ r ..{_Ci_.-_+--j\_,..._i__.._i._?..._· __________ _ 
Broker Compon r ! _ . j_ 
hereby ogree to carry oul -~nd fulfill '"" terms and conditions lp&cified ob~vit, and the s•tlcr ogrelH to furnish good ond morkelobl11 till!! with abslrocl to dolo or vi Seller's 
'of tille iMuronce in the nom11 of the purchaser ond to mokr: final conveyance by werronly dH>d or ; 
f sole of oth"r than real property. sellor will provide evid&nce of till .. or right to sell or leose. If either porly foils so to do, he agrees lo pay all expen'"' of onforcing 
• or of ony righ.t orisiiig ovl of the breach thorcof1 including o reosono!Jl11 oltoln!!_(s fe~. 
:e original n.r;rcement for i tem·s on lines ~'{-5:;. . 
c~s First National Bank is design~tcJ at escrow holder. Buyer · .:=i.nd Sclle:r to each 
_'/ 1-\02.f of escrow feer;. 
:ve~ ~uthorizea all monies nvid nrior to closing bo be paid to seller as the ~onies 
·H':"!r ·pi ves p;~rr.iis.sion to the bll;;,·cr to ~~ on the premi::.;es nnd do whatercr is. n<)ccssc~~7 
i fa~m the i:J:r•Yoertv .- ns of ifarch 1), 1~/10 / 
lis av,1·cem~nt is cub,ject to the approval of Zio:is First Nat' l Bank.. / 
>=. 
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~·~~ 
Date 
B. (Srote low reQuires brokerJ ··,o furnish co~ies of I.hi~ conlroct. bearing all Jignolures t~ b11yer and seller. Dependent upon the method used one f th f II • f f · 
. . ·. . . . .. :. . .. • o e o owing orms must bt 
.. · ·· ,. . · .·. RECEIPT 
.r 
0. 
I. 
2. 
·," ..• o .. ··' (./ 
I personally. ~ouse.d o fin~( copy of .the for~going agreement bearing oll si;norurei to I>. moiled to the O Seller, O Purchaser, on 
. . . . · ·... .. . . 19 • by reghlered moil and return receipt is attached hereto. 
6y ____________ __; __________ _.·,.:., 
PLAINTIFF'S T:XHIBiT #./.?.::.. 
CASE :fFj_r;_.:z--:;3_ 
./3.-~ . .IS 
,! 
~ I~ 
~' 
I 
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:>• li:toid~r~d or.J O!l~&~d Oo,mor1:t1. 
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i1 Eo~no;I Mor•ty 11,.:.,J1,t ar.d Ofior le; f'urcho,?. -
h!101.l !~eal .:.,GtBte Jnc ·( ~.;· .. ,:·(.:~.~ -~ · t"'~;(rr .. {; ,_ .. ,/ 
~==--:::==:-· ~~~-.:-~~~~~ .. --,:_~~:= ~~:~::;:~;.;=;:~~·~~~~_,,_ ~,~;=~;;~~i~~~~:ii-1~~--~~~.=:;L-:~~~--<;--~7~~ .-.. 
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to ch 
·.~u1}~ oi· ::;alin8 is designated 
psy half of ·escrow -fees. 
is aware that one of the buyero is 
as e scrov.r hold er. 
reai estate a~ent. 
lo- t;><j_;,., broS..•n lo l11rni1P, cop;.-, of lh;s -c<>nlrocr 1>-ro,;"ll oil Jipnolur•• Ip b.,, .• , ond s1tll•r. 0.;:-nd•nl vp::>n th• ..,et!l:>d .,,..d, on• of the fpllo· .. U.g J.,,.,.1 .,.11 ' 
RECEIPT 
c { ~t{f ·,,. 
I • ~. ( 
f I .J- 0:>-- :" • 
_________________ 19 _____ , by •••"'••ed rne>il "'"'' ••'"'n r•reipt is olloch•d h•r•lo. 
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EXHIBIT ''E" 
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